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Governing the formal economy: 
The convergence of theory and divergence of practice 
 
In 1996, Colin Leys wrote an article for the British journal New Political Economy, lamenting what 
he saw as the ÔcrisisÕ of development theory. Leys was, of course, not the first to offer this kind 
of diagnosis. David Booth (1985) penned a similar article a decade earlier, couched in terms of a 
theoretical ÔimpasseÕ - a depiction that became something of a rallying cry for development 
theorists of varying persuasions during the 1990s, offering as they did different theoretical 
remedies for overcoming this supposed ÔimpasseÕ (Schruuman 1994; Hettne 1995: Payne 1998). 
But where LeysÕ contribution differed from the others on offer was the greater emphasis he 
placed on the importance of Ôreal worldÕ events, as opposed to the theoretical deficiencies of 
competing models, in determining the fate of the discipline. As Leys (1996: 45) put it at the time: 
 
There is unease now about what ÔdevelopmentÕ meansÉso long as collective socioeconomic 
interests are supposed to be the products of the action of market forces rather than goals of 
strategic state action, the domain of 'development theory' is radically changed, if not abolished; 
that what is left is simply a world economy whose effects are overwhelmingly determined by very 
powerful states and market actors, with at most minor modifications or delays brought about by 
the actions of lesser states, social movements, communities, or whatever, that do not have 
significant military or market power. 
 
In other words, the impasse could not be easily overcome through the refinement of existing 
theories or the construction of new models, since the roots of the crisis were material rather than 
ideational in nature. More specifically, Leys suggested (1996: 41), the transformation of the world 
economy ushered in by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of regulated capital 
movements and international trade - and the subsequent destabilization and collapse of import-
substitution industrialization (ISI) and other statist models of development - signified the Ôend of 
national development as it had hitherto been conceivedÕ. At the time Leys was writing in the 
mid-1990s, it was difficult to disagree with his analysis. This, to recall, was the period in which 
neoliberal globalization was arguably at its peak; it was a period marked by the acceptance by 
elites throughout the developing and post-socialist world (with greater or lesser degrees of 
enthusiasm) of the need to conform to the strictures of liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization; when the growth of transnational production, trade and financial integration 
appeared to render the economic role of the state (as previously understood) obsolete; and when 
the increasing embeddedness of the institutions of global governance - principally, the IMF, 
World Bank and newly established WTO - appeared to challenge not only the de facto but also 
the de jure economic sovereignty of the nation-state. 
 
In the light of more recent trends - and with the benefit of hindsight - it is now easy to see that 
LeysÕ characterization of development studies was overly pessimistic and his presumption of the 
inevitable triumph of neoliberal globalization premature. Indeed, within a couple of years of the 
Ôcrisis of development theoryÕ appearing in print, developing and newly-industrializing countries 
were already beginning to lose faith in some of the central tenets of neoliberalism: most notably, 
capital account liberalization following the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-8. This was soon 
followed by the so-called Ôpink tideÕ that swept through Latin America, with the election of leftist 
governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela symbolizing the 
increasingly tarnished reputation of the neoliberal development model in a region once 
synonymous with it. Finally, and most dramatically of all, the 2008 global financial crisis 
appeared to signal that, as UK prime minister Gordon Brown famously put it at the time, Ôthe 
old Washington Consensus is overÕ (Winnett et al 2009). As it turned out, this declaration, too, 
soon looked premature (Crouch 2011). But arguably, the fundamental lesson to draw from the 
experience of the financial crisis lies not in the resilience or otherwise of neoliberalism, but in the 
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spectacular emergence of China and its willingness to underwrite United States profligacy, which 
provided the macroeconomic conditions that gave rise to the crisis in the first place. In other 
words, the global financial crisis was as much about ChinaÕs rise as it was about excessive risk 
taking, lax regulation or even the politics of sovereign debt and austerity. And while there is an 
ongoing debate about the nature of ChinaÕs model of political economy - and that of the other 
ÔBRICsÕ and emerging powers - what is obvious is that it falls a long way short of the neoliberal 
vision of development (Ban and Blyth 2013). Framed in accordance with LeysÕ thesis, then, the 
omnipotence of neoliberalism can no longer be taken for granted; nor can it be assumed that 
policy convergence is either an inevitable or necessary consequence of global economic 
integration. 
 
In this chapter, I expand on these observations. I do so by asking what, after over half a century 
of dedicated scholarship and policy experimentation, does development studies have to say 
about the relationship between the state and the market? Although the general tenor of much 
development commentary in recent years has been to emphasize the diminishing scope for state 
activism in the face of global economic integration and neoliberal policy convergence, I argue 
that this tendency is mistaken on two counts. First, I suggest that the contradistinction between a 
supposedly ÔGolden AgeÕ (Payne and Phillips 2010) of development theory  and the neoliberal 
era typically rests on a faulty caricature of just how central the analysis of the state was to the 
understanding of development in the former period. It is certainly true that the ÔGolden AgeÕ 
represented a period of great optimism for what could be achieved by postcolonial societies 
through utilizing the transformative capacity and emancipatory potential of the state; yet this 
sentiment did not always rest on a systematic or reliable analysis of how the state actually 
functioned in the development process. Second, in contrast, I argue that the neoliberal era was 
actually marked by a growing recognition of the institutional determinants of growth, especially 
once it became clear that market-oriented reform was leading to a divergence rather than a 
convergence of development outcomes. The most obvious example of this, I suggest, is the 
developmental state literature that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in the midst of neoliberal 
triumphalism; but this was also the period in which the institutionalist ÔturnÕ in the social sciences 
as a whole began to make its mark on development studies (Remmer 1997).  I go on to suggest 
that this institutionalist ÔturnÕ is now providing the basis for a convergence of sorts between 
orthodox and heterodox theories, with respect to issues such as the historical origins of private 
property rights, norms of democratic transparency and accountability, the importance of 
bureaucratic autonomy, elite consensus and state capacity. I conclude by arguing that the state 
has never been considered more important to the understanding of development. Hence, the 
significance of the rise of China and the other BRIC economies is not that it shows the 
superiority of either state- or market-oriented development models, but rather, it is the distinct 
institutional pathways that nation-states follow which explains why the adoption of ostensibly 
similar (or even ostensibly different) development strategies often leads to vastly divergent 
development outcomes. 
 
 
The ÔGolden AgeÕ of development theory 
 
In a recent text, Tony Payne and Nicola Phillips (2010) described the period from 1945 to the 
mid-1970s as the ÔGolden AgeÕ of development theory. Although the authors do not provide 
much further elaboration of the appropriateness of the term, they argue that two notable 
features defined the period. On the one hand, despite the different epistemologic theory, 
structuralism and dependency (Payne and Phillips refer to the latter two as a single 
ÔunderdevelopmentÕ paradigm), each was conceived broadly within the parameters of Keynesian 
growth theory. On the other hand, each of these paradigms took for granted the assumption of 
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ÔexceptionalismÕ on the part of postcolonial societies, that is, a belief in the Ôapparently distinctive 
problemsÕ encountered by the ÔThird WorldÕ (Payne and Phillips 2010: 84). A third feature of this 
ÔGolden AgeÕ, implied but not stated explicitly by the authors, is that it was taken for granted that 
the promotion of development would require a primary role for the state. Yet, the paradox of 
the ÔGolden AgeÕ is that the advocacy of state-led development was not always informed by a 
thorough or systematic theoretical analysis of the state itself. This critique is most easily sustained 
in relation to modernization theory. As is well known, the intellectual roots of modernization 
theory lay with classical evolutionary sociology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and 
the structural-functionalism of the early twentieth, wherein social and behavioural change was 
deemed to be a linear process that took place according to a series of discrete phases. An equally 
popular and important influence on early postwar modernization literature was the adoption of 
the methods and techniques of the newly established school of behaviouralism, founded on the 
belief that the social world could and should be studied according to the scientific tenets of 
rational-positivism and empiricism. The upshot of all of this was that modernization theory 
became associated with the idea that social and political change was evolutionary and progressive 
in nature; and that the determinants of modernization itself were largely observable and 
therefore amenable to the scientific techniques of behaviouralism. 
 
In practice, of course, these assumptions were soon revealed to be at odds with the actual 
postcolonial experience in Africa, Asia, Latin America and elsewhere. In a characteristically well-
timed intervention, Samuel Huntington published an article in World Politics in 1965, entitled 
ÔPolitical Development and Political DecayÕ, which shone a spotlighton this discrepancy. 
Huntington made an important distinction between economic modernization from what he 
called Ôpolitical developmentÕ, defined as the Ôprocess by which organizations and procedures 
acquire value and stabilityÕ (Huntington 1965: 394). The relationship between these two 
processes, Huntington argued, was neither necessarily evolutionary nor progressive; indeed, the 
opposite was more likely to be the case, as social mobilization and political participation 
associated with modernization came to be seen as Ôdirectly responsible for the deterioration of 
political institutionsÕ (Huntington 1965: 405; Remmer 1997: 34-5). The notion that the process 
of modernization in postcolonial societies might follow non-linear and idiosyncratic patterns, 
distinct from those supposedly taken by Ôfirst waveÕ industrializers, was something that had been 
anticipated earlier by development economists such as Gunner Myrdal (1957) and Dudley Seers 
(1963). The most influential variant of this position, however, was that associated with Hans 
Singer (1951) and Raul Prebisch (1950), who independently came to the conclusion that the 
drivers of economic change were historically and structurally determined, that the benefits of 
international trade fell disproportionately to the industrialized countries and that therefore, 
rather than propel modernization, the dependence of postcolonial societies on primary exports 
would only serve to entrenched further their underdevelopment.  
 
The ÔSinger-Prebisch thesisÕ, as it became known, proved to be tremendously influential over the 
next two decades, and will forever be synonymous with the adoption - and subsequent 
abandonment - of ISI in Latin America and elsewhere. While it was arguably the practice of ISI 
that did the most lasting damage to the credibility of the Singer-Prebisch thesis, looking back, it 
is now easy to see that the model also suffered from an obvious theoretical failing: namely, the 
failure to recognize the institutional - that is, domestic - correlates of external dependency. Put 
differently, because so much emphasis was placed on the historical and structural determinants 
of international trade, the theory provided few clues as to why some postcolonial societies 
managed to escape commodity dependence while others did not. Nor did the theory appear to 
have an answer to the question of why policy-makers in postcolonial societies seemed incapable 
of using the macroeconomic policy tools at their disposal to mitigate the problems associated 
with commodity dependence, such the enclave nature of the production process or the problems 
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associated with what later became known as ÔDutch diseaseÕ. At least initially, dependency theory 
came equipped with a plausible set of answers to these questions. Paul Baran set the tone for this 
with the publication of The Political Economy of Growth in 1957, which argued that the economic 
exploitation of the postcolonial world was not only integral to worldwide capitalist accumulation, 
but was aided and abetted by a local comprador class, whose actions were driven by self-
enrichment at the expense of the impoverishment of their populations.  
 
This theme later became the hallmark of the Latin American school of dependency, whose 
heritage lay in equal measure with the structuralist economics associated with Raul Prebisch and 
the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and the neo-Marxism associated with 
Paul Baran and others. Like the structuralists, dependency writers started from the proposition 
that, as expressed famously by Dos Santos (1970: 231), Ôa relationship of interdependence 
between two or more economies or between such economies and the world trading system 
becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can expand only as a reflection of the 
dominant countriesÕ. But where these writers departed from the ECLA tradition was in the much 
greater emphasis that they placed on the domestic Ð the analysis of social class more specifically 
Ð correlates of external dependency. Dependency theory arguably reached its apogee with 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo FalettoÕs Dependency and Development in Latin America (first 
published in Spanish in 1971 but not translated into English until 1979), whose nuance and 
sophistication appeared to promise a non-determinist social science capable of escaping the 
theoretical cud-de-sac that structuralism had by this stage run into. In retrospect, however, it is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that even this classic work rested on a latent form of economic 
reductionism, and in the endcould not avoid the accusation that it, too, was guilty of excessive 
ÔexogenismÕ (Hettne 1995). The decade of the 1970s witnessed the growing ÔconsumptionÕ 
(Cardoso 1977) of dependency outside of Latin America with the vibrancy and intensity of the 
intellectual debate continuing to reflect the movementÕs mixed heritage. Yet, it can be scarcely 
claimed that this debate did much to elucidate a clear or workable set of policy prescriptions that 
might enable those developing countries afflicted by dependency to escape the condition. 
Indeed, as Lloyd Best (1996: 4), doyen of the Caribbean dependency school, later caustically 
remarked about the impact of the theory on his particular part of the world, the more faithfully 
the strategies deriving from radical theorists in the region were followed, Ôthe more disastrous 
have been the consequences for the common peopleÕ. 
 
Neoliberalism and Ôthe end of developmentÕ 
 
On 13thAugust 1982, MexicoÕs Finance Minister, Jesus Silva Herzog, is alleged to have turned up 
at the US Treasury and, as one official described it at the time, Ôturned his pockets inside outÕ 
(quoted in Lissakers 1983). Whether or not this incident actually took place - which seems 
unlikely - what is undeniable is that the Mexican default, and the subsequent Latin American 
Ôdebt crisisÕ, came to symbolize the exhaustion of the ISI-led model of development and, by 
implication, the theoretical ideas that had underpinned it. Instead, global development politics 
soon became synonymous with Ôpolicy-based lendingÕ and Ôstructural adjustmentÕ, in accordance 
with the neoliberal strictures of liberalization, deregulation and privatization. Critics labeled this 
new paradigm Ôanti-developmentÕ (Pieterse 2010) for its unwillingness to acknowledge the idea 
that underdevelopment - or, more accurately, the absence of economic growth  - was a unique 
ÔThird WorldÕ problem, requiring a discrete set of policy interventions to ameliorate it. Instead, 
as Leys (1996: 42) scathingly put it, Ôby the end of the 1980s the only development policy that 
was officially approved was not having one Ð leaving it to the market to allocate resources, not 
the stateÕ. This depiction was almost certainly a deliberate caricature on LeysÕ part; yet it did 
capture neatly the naivety and fanaticism that accompanied early neoliberal policy 
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experimentation. Even so, the theoretical grounds for this market fundamentalism lay in a 
penetrating critique of earlier development thinking and policy prescriptions associated with it. 
 
While Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman built the intellectual foundations of 
neoliberalism, these voices had a direct counterpoint in the disciplinary subfield of Ôdevelopment 
economicsÕ. During the 1960s, a growing number of heretical voices associated, most notably, 
with the Journal of Political Economy questioned the very idea of a need for a specific branch of 
economics dedicated to the supposedly distinctive problems of the ÔThird WorldÕ (Rapley 2007: 
68). A particular important substrand to this neoliberal insurgency was the application of the 
rational choice assumptions of neoclassical economics to public institutions, otherwise known as 
public choice theory, to show the alleged folly of state-led development models and related 
forms of economic planning. In this vein, KruegerÕs (1974) work on the political economy of 
rent seeking in the allocation of import quotas was particularly influential. The basic thrust of 
KruegerÕs argument was that the allocation of import licenses created a perverse incentive for 
unprofitable firms to exaggerate their need for these licenses in order to capture the economic 
rent derived from the operation of the quota (that is, the difference between world market prices 
and the artificially high price obtained in the quota-restricted market) by selling on to a third 
party. Robert Bates (1981), meanwhile, applied public choice assumptions to the problem of 
development failure in sub-Saharan Africa. Bates (1981: 3) began his analysis with an intriguing 
question: Ôwhy should reasonable men [sic] adopt public policies that have harmful consequences 
for the societies they govern?Õ To answer this, Bates drew on Olsonian theories of interest group 
politics to reveal the extent to which urban bias typically found in African development planning 
- e.g. overvalued exchange rates, state-controlled marketing boards, price restrictions, support for 
ISI, and so on - was rooted in urban-based class alliances that provided the political support for 
highly inefficient, urban-based industries at the expense of the more productive, rural-based 
agricultural sector. As with KruegerÕs work, the key inference drawn was not just about the 
superiority of market- over state-based mechanisms of resources allocation; rather, by 
highlighting the rational calculations of individual human agents, this work was able to reveal the 
dangers and pitfalls of allocating discretion powers over economic policy to public officials 
exposed to the rent-seeking and lobbying activities of interest groups. In short, neoliberalism 
rested on a theoretical analysis and penetrating critique of the state. 
 
The neoliberals did not, however, have everything their own way. In 1982, Chalmers Johnson 
published his path-breaking book, MITI and the Japanese Miracle. The central insight provided by 
Johnson was to draw attention to the importance to economic development (understood here in 
terms of growth, production and competitiveness rather than welfare) of a small but capable and 
politically insulated bureaucratic elite with the means and capacity to promote Ômarket 
conformingÕ methods of state intervention. Although this insight initially went against the grain 
of the neoliberal orthodoxy of the 1980s - which initially proclaimed the spectacular economic 
successes of East Asia as testimony of the merits of laissez-faire and market-led industrialization 
- subsequent work in the same vein served to substantiate and refine the development state 
concept (Hamilton 1986; White 1987; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). The work of Robert Wade, 
for instance, sought to infuse what he saw as JohnsonÕs overly-descriptive thesis with what he 
called a Ôcomparative-analyticÕ dimension, capable of identifying the causal link between specific 
policies and industrial performance. In particular, Wade (1990) argued that the key to the 
industrial transformation in East Asia lay not with the role of the state per se, but with early and 
specific forms of intervention - especially heavy investment in human capital and infrastructure, 
which subsequently propelled export-oriented industrialization. The logic underpinning WadeÕs 
argument (and hence the development state concept more generally) was to turn the orthodox 
neoliberal interpretation on its head: the adoption of Ômarket-friendlyÕ policies and the 
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promotion of exports were, in short, a consequence rather than a cause of East AsiaÕs industrial 
transformation.  
 
But, arguably, the lasting significance of the Ôdevelopmental stateÕ literature was not simply that it 
served to temper neoliberal triumphalism; it was that it drew attention to the institutional 
conditions that underlay the development success of East Asia. Crucially, this theoretical insight 
coincided with a renaissance of institutionalist analysis in political and social sciences more 
widely (March & Olson 1984; Hall & Taylor 1994). In a way, neoliberalism - and public choice 
theory more specifically - contributed to this renaissance by providing a plausible set of 
microfoundations to the analysis of the political economy of development (Remmer 1997: 50). 
The application of rational choice assumptions to public institutions would find echoes in the 
pioneering work of Douglass North (1991) on institutions and economic development.  At the 
other end of the spectrum, political scientists and heterodox political economists drew 
increasingly on institutional analysis, not simply to account for the success or failure of particular 
development models, but why they were adopted in the first place. In Pathways from the Periphery, 
for example, Stephan Haggard (1990) sought to account for why it was that South Korea, 
Taiwan, Brazil and Mexico all began with ostensibly similar development strategies build around 
ISI, but whereas the former two moved rapidly towards the promotion of export-oriented 
growth the latter two did not. Similarly, work in the 1990s on the politics of economic reform 
associated with structural adjustment and the adoption of neoliberal policies (Nelson 1989: 
Haggard & Kaufmann 1992; Haggard & Webb 1994), saw scholars examine the institutional and 
behavioural determinants of the success or otherwise of market-oriented reform: in short, why 
was it that neoliberal policy experimentation was quickly abandoned or scaled back in some 
cases, and followed through more determinedly and (on occasion) successfully in others? The 
answer to both sets of questions, it was concluded, lay with the specific ways in which different 
institutional configurations and political alliances were able to manage the distributive conflict 
associated with economic change. In summary, by the mid-1990s the political debate concerning 
market- versus state-based mechanisms of resources allocation appeared to have been settled 
decisively in favour of the former; yet the analytical debate concerning the determinants of 
growth and development increasingly coalesced around the importance of institutions, not least 
the state itself. 
 
The convergence of theory and divergence of practice 
 
During the 2000s, institutional analysis has arguably become the central focal point for both 
orthodox and heterodox theories of development. On the orthodox side, this has been seen in 
the influence of the so-called Ônew institutional economicsÕ on mainstream development 
thinking, both inside and outside of the World Bank - especially under the guise of the post-
Washington Consensus. Although the significance of the supposed pragmatic shift from the 
original Washington Consensus to the post-Washington Consensus has been the subject of 
widespread analytical scepticism (Standing 2000; Fine et al. 2003; niş and Şenses 2005), one 
discernible difference lies in the emphasis placed on what Dani Rodik and Arvind Subramanian 
(2003) describe as the Ôprimacy of institutionsÕ. Institutions are understood here in accordance 
with Douglass NorthÕs (1991a: 97) seminal definition, as Ôhumanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interactionsÕ. This definition has principally, but not 
exclusively, been used to refer to economic institutions, specifically those pertaining to property 
rights and contract law (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001). In his own work, Rodrik has 
been keen to stress the importance of what he calls Ômarket stabilizingÕ and Ômarket legitimizingÕ 
institutions, alongside Ômarket regulatingÕ institutions. In a key paper from 1999, for example, 
Rodrik attributed the failure of the majority of sub-Saharan African economies to bounce back 
quickly from the external economic shocks of the 1970s to the general absence of social and 
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political institutions capable of managing distributive conflict and allowing for legitimate and 
appropriate policy responses.  
 
RodrikÕs emphasis on the stabilization and legitimizing functions of institutions finds echoes in 
some of the key heterodox political economy literature, perhaps most notably in the influential 
work of Adrian Leftwich (see, especially, Leftwich 2000). Like Rodrik, Leftwich (2005) makes a 
distinction between ÔeconomicÕ and ÔpoliticalÕ institutions, but whereas the former sees the 
relationship between these two as, at least in theory, mutually supportive, the latter is less 
sanguine about the prospects for this. The reason for this, Leftwich suggests, is that the stability 
of economic institutions, far from being integral to successful development, might be an 
insurmountable barrier to it. Leftwich offers the example of land reform, which as he rightly 
points out is rarely brought about consensually (e.g. China in 1949, Cuba in 1959 or South Korea 
during the Japanese occupation or after the military coup in 1960). Thus, inclusive democratic 
institutions - which Rodrik sees as providing the stabilizing and legitimizing functions necessary 
for economic development - might not be the most conducive setting for a successful land 
reform programme. The principal reason for this is that democracy requires that the losers (in 
this case the landowners) are sufficiently persuaded that it is in their interests to abide by the 
rules of the democratic game and commit to what Adam Przeworski (1986) calls the 
Ôinstitutionalized uncertaintyÕ of electoral competition. Leftwich is careful to point out, however, 
that this did not mean that democracy is anathema to successful development or that 
authoritarian regimes have proven to be necessarily any better at promoting development. 
Rather, there is an inherent tension between the imperatives of economic institutions and 
political institutions that, while not irresolvable, necessitates a constant trade-off to be managed 
successfully. Ultimately for Leftwich (2010), the successful management of these trade-offs lies 
in the political realm: that is, the role of purposeful human agents - individuals, groups, 
organisations and coalitions - in the design, formation and maintenance of institutions holds the 
key to understanding why certain development experiments succeed while others fail. It is only 
by analysing the behavioural characteristics of leaders and elites in forming and sustaining 
development coalitions, Leftwich argues, that we can fully account for the economic success of 
small and externally vulnerable economies such as Botswana and Mauritius, as well as notable 
failures like Myanmar, Fiji and Yemen. 
 
Applying these theoretical insights to the case of the BRIC economies, it becomes easier to 
understand why the search for a generalizable ÔmodelÕ to characterize these cases, as in the 
concept of the ÔBeijing ConsensusÕ (Ramo 2004; Williamson 2012), has proven misguided. As 
Cornel Ban and Mark Blyth (2013: 241) put it, the BRICs have Ôneither pioneered a post-
neoliberal transformation, nor have they proved to be forces for the continuation of Washington 
Consensus ideas and policiesÕ. What the BRICS have shown is that size and systemic importance 
matter, not least because it has enabled these economies to resist the neoliberal strictures of the 
Washington Consensus to pursue more autonomous, state-led development strategies. But this is 
not the whole story. In each case, to the degree to which the BRICs have implemented 
neoliberal economic policies, they have done so in accordance with the distinct institutional 
pathways each has followed. This is based on different forms of hybridization wherein the 
pursuit of neoliberal economic polices has been filtered through historically and institutionally 
embedded ideas and practices (Ban and Blyth 2013: 245). In BrazilÕs case, for example, the 
commitment to orthodox macroeconomic discipline and the adoption of privatization and 
deregulatory reforms has gone hand in hand with heterodox measures and interventions, 
including the use of public development banks and an expansionary minimum wage policy to 
provide fiscal stimulus during the crisis, alongside targeted industrial policy and use of state-
owned firms to provide welfare and employment programmes (Ban 2013). By contrast, IndiaÕs 
embrace of the Washington Consensus following the 1991 balance of payments crisis appears to 
8 
 
have involved a more radical paradigm shift from the countryÕs previous commitment to import 
substitution. But, as Rahul Makherji (2013) suggests, this was not the first occasion in which 
neoliberal reforms had been put forward in India. The key difference is that by 1991 the 
encroachment of neoclassical ideas - which had been gaining ground in elite policy-making 
circles since the late-1970s - was buttressed by the emergence of a powerful coalition of 
industrialists, professionals and farmers that provided the necessary political support to ensure 
that the reform process was able to take root. The key summative point, then, is not that the 
experience of the BRIC economies shows the superiority of either state- or market-oriented 
development models; rather, it is the distinct institutional pathways - and political coalitions that 
underpin them -which accounts for the economic models that different economies follow and, 
to a degree, the successes and failures associated with them. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have offered a stylized (and necessarily brief) historical account of the political 
economy of development by asking what, after over half a century of dedicated scholarship and 
policy experimentation, does the discipline have to say about the relationship between the state 
and the market. The answer I have provided has centred on the identification of what amounts 
to a paradox: namely, in the time in which the role of the state in the practice of development has 
been substantially reduced, the role of the state in the analysis of development has been 
substantially increased. This trend can be detected in orthodox and heterodox scholarship, both 
of which are now arguably dominated by the study of institutions. The key insight offered by 
institutionalism is the insistence on what is known in the jargon as ÔendogeneityÕ, by which is 
meant that the political economy of individual nation-states is defined by the discrete historical 
pathways that they take.  Once adopted, institutions have a tendency to endure and take on a 
path-dependent character, wherein past practices and policies shape and constrain, but do not 
determine, future trajectories. This insight helps us to understand why neither the ubiquity of 
neoliberalism nor the imperatives of global economic integration has led to the degree of policy 
convergence that might have otherwise been expected. By the same token, the endogeneity of 
institutions also provides important clues to why the search within the development success of 
the BRIC economies for a ÔmodelÕ of development to rival the Washington Consensus has 
proven misguided. Emphasizing the endogeneity of institutions Ð and therefore the domestic 
sources of growth and development Ð does not mean, of course, that the external, historical and 
structural obstacles highlighted by earlier theories of development are now deemed to be of less 
causal significance. But what it does mean is that, once these factors have been taken into 
account, it is the idiosyncratic institutional characteristics of individual nation-states Ð and the 
extent to which these institutions are capable of providing mechanisms for resolving the 
distributive conflict associated with economic change and appropriate incentive structures for 
effective coalition building Ð that accounts for those that achieve development success and those 
that do not.  
 
(word count: 5167) 
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